This paper studies how the design of debt restructuring programs shapes labor market outcomes. Using administrative data from Sweden and a novel examiner IV design, I find that participation reduces labor income and employment on average, with effects that persist after the program ends. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity. This heterogeneity reflects differential exposure to upward repayment adjustments, which discourage unemployed participants from seeking work. I use a calibrated labor supply model to show that modest changes in program structure can improve welfare for both debtors and creditors.
Using Swedish administrative data and a stacked difference-in-differences design, we estimate substantial, persistent worker earnings losses following corporate acquisitions. Losses reflect displacement and lower earnings among target-firm stayers. We find no evidence that increased monopsony power explains stayer losses. These losses concentrate in acquisitions with pre-existing connections between the acquirer and target, particularly when an acquirer employee served on the target’s board before the transaction.
Many part-time workers want to increase their hours at their current job. Yet we know little about why their employers deny them more hours. We develop a model in which firms set wages and hours and show that involuntary part-time employment depends on production technology and labor market competition. Linking Swedish surveys to administrative records, we confirm the model’s predictions empirically. Involuntary part-time employment is more prevalent in jobs where additional hours bring less revenue than additional hires and in more concentrated labor markets. We then use mass layoffs as granular shocks to labor market concentration and find that greater concentration reduces hours of part-time workers and increases the gap between their desired and actual hours.